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Abstract 
We investigate the performance of mutual funds that trade using private information. 
These funds are uniquely identified from a set of 2,730 funds with 44,315 fund-periods between 
1994 and 2005. We compare the alignment of fund trades with brokers‟ recommendations, which 
we regard as “public information” in the universe of informed and uninformed mutual funds. 
Funds that systematically trade counter to the public information form a homogenous subset of 
the privately informed funds. By using private information that contradicts the public 
information, these funds exhibit a superior average performance. After we control for serial 
correlation in fund returns, we assess this advantage as being an economically significant 1.7% 
per annum. We also show empirically that smaller funds are better able to capture the benefit of 
private information. 
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1. Introduction 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) present a rational expectations equilibrium model in which 
informed investors respond to private information concerning a risky asset while uninformed 
investors respond to price information that partially reveals the private signal. They suggest 
private information should provide investors with the opportunity to earn greater returns. To test 
this proposition, most studies use information available to a subset of investors to proxy private 
information, and assess its return benefit relative to the performance of the wider, uninformed 
population.  
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) classify mutual funds as uninformed when they trade using a 
proxy for public information, and as informed when they conduct trades that appear inconsistent 
with this information. Similar to Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), we use broker recommendations 
as a proxy for public information. We also use broker recommendations to identify mutual funds 
that systematically trade on public information, which we classify as uninformed. However, in 
contrast to Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), we statistically identify funds that trade counter to 
brokers‟ recommendations, and classify these as informed investors. We use the Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) rational expectations equilibrium framework to develop our predictions. 
Our empirical technique integrates the periodic stock holdings of mutual funds obtained 
from Thomson Financial Services Inc. with the consensus recommendations provided by 
Institutional Brokers‟ Estimate System (IBES). By analyzing the trades of equity mutual funds in 
44,315 fund-periods between 1994 and 2005, we are able to identify individual funds that align 
their trades with brokers‟ recommendations, and those that trade counter to the 
recommendations. We compare the return distributions of these two groups, and find that funds 
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that trade contrary to brokers‟ recommendations earn statistically and economically significant 
higher average returns. We suggest that this reflects private information. 
In Section 2 a brief review of the literature using brokers‟ recommendations to proxy private 
or public information is presented. Section 3 derives our empirical predictions. In Section 4 we 
describe the data and outline our research procedure. We analyze the alignment of mutual fund 
trades with recommendations and how this affects fund returns in Section 5. In Section 6, we 
perform robustness tests while Section 7 summarizes and concludes the research. 
 
2. Literature review: Broker recommendations 
Earlier studies invariably used brokers‟ recommendations as a proxy for private information, 
while more recent studies use them as a proxy for either private or public information.
1
 However, 
determining whether they are being used to proxy private or public information depends more on 
the context in which they are used rather than the researcher‟s view of how widely the 
recommendations are disseminated. For example, when researchers use brokers‟ 
recommendations as “information”, which they compare with the alternative “no information”, 
the context most closely approximates our usage of the term “private information”.  
Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986) view brokers‟ recommendations as a proxy for private 
information. They demonstrate that by using these recommendations to create hypothetical 
portfolios of stocks, it is possible to earn excess returns. While changes to recommendations 
provide greater returns, standing recommendations also contain valuable information. They 
                                                 
1
 For example, Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) use IBOS and Womack (1996) uses First Call, obtained from 
proprietary data providers, for their source of brokers‟ recommendations. These recommendations are now more 
easily accessed.  
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report that significant excess returns are earned in the month of publication of the 
recommendation, and in the following month. Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) also use 
brokers‟ recommendations to proxy private information, but focus on changes using event study 
methodologies. Both studies find that excess returns are possible, and Womack (1996) shows 
that they can persist for six months after the change. 
Several studies have examined circumstances where brokers‟ recommendations contain 
varying private information. Sant and Zaman (1996) show that brokers‟ recommendations have 
greater value when the stocks are followed by fewer analysts. Similarly, Bradley, Chan, Kim and 
Singh (2008) find that for initial public offerings, analyst‟s recommendations contain less 
information when firms are widely followed, while Boulatov, Hatch, Johnson and Lei (2009) 
suggest that stocks which receive less attention by dealers are less efficiently priced. Autore, 
Kovacs and Sharma (2009) advise that analysts expend significant resources identifying 
mispriced securities.
2
 These costs may be avoided if analysts are affiliated to firms which reveal 
their private information. However, since the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure which 
sought to limit the release of information to affiliated analysts, Cornett, Tehranian and Yalcin 
(2007) find that the more pronounced market reaction to the downgrades of affiliated analysts 
has decreased. 
Brokers‟ recommendations adopted by institutional investors are also used as “private” 
information in studies by Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001), Chen and Cheng 
(2006), and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2008). Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) 
examine the returns from hypothetical portfolios formed using consensus recommendations, and 
                                                 
2
 Autore, Kovacs and Sharma (2009) show that brokers garner private information from their assessment of 
corporate governance quality.  
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demonstrate that private information can provide excess returns, but only when transaction costs 
are ignored. Chen and Cheng (2006) find that changes to the proportions of institutional stock 
ownership are positively correlated with contemporaneous brokers‟ recommendations. They also 
find that, as a consequence of the recommendations, institutions increase (decrease) their 
ownership of stocks that subsequently out-perform (under-perform) after risk adjustment. 
Accordingly, they conclude that recommendations contribute to the superior performance of 
mutual funds.  
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) use brokers‟ recommendations to proxy stock specific public 
information that is available to mutual fund managers. They use changes to the composition of a 
fund‟s portfolio that are uncorrelated with recent changes to brokers‟ recommendations as 
evidence of private information. Hence, they compare the returns of the funds that rely on the 
recommendations (uninformed investors) with the returns of funds that do not (informed 
investors). Their empirical results indicate a negative relation between fund performance and 
reliance on public information. That is, funds underperform if they select stocks based on 
brokers‟ recommendations but outperform if their selection of stocks is based on private 
information.  
Intuition suggests that mutual funds would only trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations 
on a systematic basis if they possessed private information. However, Kacperczyk and Seru 
(2007) regard such trades as being motivated by public information because they are correlated, 
albeit negatively, with these recommendations. Furthermore, because they classify trades that are 
uncorrelated with recommendations as being motivated by private information, they are unable 
to distinguish informed funds from those that select stocks randomly.  
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Brown, Wei and Wermers (2008) focus on the interaction of broker recommendations and 
the associated herding behavior on individual stock returns when mutual funds in unison adopt 
the recommendation. This herding behavior changes the return profiles of the stocks. They report 
that stocks with both broker recommendation upgrades and buy herding behavior in the 
following quarter are characterized by initial superior performance, whereas stocks with broker 
recommendation downgrades and sell herding behavior initially underperform. Notably, both 
groups exhibit stock price reversals which are delayed until the third and fourth quarters after 
herding, probably because herding behavior is persistent. By implication, mutual funds that 
acquire (sell) stocks with recommendation upgrades (downgrades) as part of a herd may initially 
outperform funds that neither follow broker recommendations nor herd, and may also exhibit 
relative underperformance six months later. 
The present study empirically determines whether the individual fund‟s trades are positively, 
negatively or uncorrelated with brokers‟ recommendations. While the initial returns of funds 
with positively correlated trades may be enhanced by herding behavior, funds with negatively or 
uncorrelated trades should be unaffected. Accordingly, herding does not offer an alternative 
explanation to our premise that funds which trade counter to public information use private 
information which, assuming it is correct, will result in positive abnormal returns.  
 
3. Empirical predictions 
We derive our empirical predictions within the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) rational 
expectations equilibrium framework. In the application of this model to the universe of mutual 
fund investors, we regard brokers‟ recommendations as publicly available information. These 
recommendations do not provide an expected valuation of an asset, but rather provide a 
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recommendation as to whether it should be purchased or sold given its current market price. 
Nonetheless, this information is available to all mutual fund investors, and as Brown, Wei, and 
Wermers (2008) demonstrate, is impounded in their collective buying and selling behavior. 
In the same way that public information about an asset is impounded in the trading behavior 
of the mutual funds, public information is impounded in the return expectations of the privately 
informed mutual funds. This insight allows us to apply the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
framework, and demonstrate that a private (information) signal about an asset is directly related 
to informed investor demand for that asset.
3
 Accordingly, informed investors increase (decrease) 
their demand when private expected returns on a risky asset are high (low), irrespective of the 
observed buying and selling behavior of the uninformed investors.  
The trades of privately informed mutual funds may exhibit a range of alignments with 
brokers‟ recommendations as a consequence of their response to private signals that are 
variously aligned. Notably, and in contrast to Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), this includes funds 
that trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations. Where mutual funds trade in the same direction 
with respect to brokers‟ recommendations, it is not possible to distinguish privately informed 
from uninformed funds. However, informed funds distinguish themselves when they 
systematically trade in the opposite direction from their uninformed counterparts. 
Similar to Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) we use the alignment of fund trades to identify funds 
that are privately informed. However, they classify funds as privately informed when their trades 
are uncorrelated
4
 with brokers‟ recommendations whereas we classify funds as uniquely 
                                                 
3
By assuming all public information is impounded in the return expectations of privately informed funds, we avoid 
the Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) requirement for two types of signal – one public and one private.  
4
 Funds may be motivated to trade particular stocks for other reasons such as the stock‟s liquidity, portfolio 
rebalancing, risk management and a response to fund flows. These trades may be independent of information in 
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privately informed only when they trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations. In addition, we 
conjecture that private information may be incrementally more valuable when it contradicts 
public information compared to when it provides the same signal to buy or sell a stock as the 
brokers‟ recommendations.   
Consistent with the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) prediction that informed investors increase 
their demand when expected returns on the risky asset are high, and that these trades will result 
in positive abnormal returns if the private information proves to be accurate,
5
 we formally 
predict: 
Prediction 1: Mutual funds that trade counter to the direction of brokers’ recommendations will 
receive higher risk adjusted returns. 
Prior research has shown that fund size can impact the prices of the shares that are traded. 
Keim and Madhavan (1998) find that large trades have the greatest price effect, and are more 
likely to reveal information because they are commonly traded in packages or “shopped” before 
execution. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) show that fund performance decreases with 
fund size, and attribute this to transaction costs associated with liquidity or price impact.  Small 
funds have less price impact on the stocks they wish to trade, with less information leakage, and 
are therefore better placed to capture the higher risk adjusted returns. Therefore, we also predict: 
Prediction 2: Of the mutual funds that trade counter to the direction of brokers 
recommendations, smaller funds will generate higher risk adjusted returns.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
either the private or public domain such that, in common with the trades that Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) classify as 
informed, they do not correlate with broker‟s recommendations. 
5
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for succinctly stating this proposition.  
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4. Data description and methodology 
4.1. Data description 
We use mean brokers‟ recommendations, which IBES reports monthly, for the period 
January 1994 – December 2005 to proxy publicly available information. Covering the same 
interval, we obtain the periodic stock holdings of all US equity mutual funds from Thomson 
Financial Services Ltd. We infer transactions from changes to the holdings, which are most 
commonly reported quarterly, while allowing for stock capitalization changes. Monthly and daily 
stock price, return and turnover data are obtained from Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and are used to calculate quarterly excess returns and stock liquidity measures before 
being combined with the holdings data. The CRSP mutual fund returns are matched with the 
Thomson‟s holdings data using Mutual Fund Links.6 
4.2. Method 
Initially, we develop a procedure to rank stocks based on the mean brokers‟ recommendation 
and change in recommendation. We use this ranking to assign each fund‟s stocks to several 
“broker-rank” buckets. We then use regression analysis to determine which funds trade 
consistent with, and which funds trade counter to, brokers‟ recommendations. Finally, we 
                                                 
6
 To ensure that our data covers most of the changes to a mutual fund‟s portfolio, we restrict our sample to funds 
with average equity holdings exceeding 80% and average cash holdings below 10% of fund assets. In a further 
restriction to limit data errors and omissions, we must be able to replicate within 10% of the value of the fund‟s net 
tangible assets by using the stock holdings data and assuming start-of-period prices for the stock for it to remain in 
our sample. 
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compare the return performances of funds that we identify as aligning their trades with brokers‟ 
recommendations, with those of funds that trade counter to recommendations.
7
 
4.2.1. Ranking by brokers’ recommendation 
IBES averages the recommendations of a varying number of brokers, which are coded on a 1 
to 5 scale, with 1 being a “strong buy” recommendation. The mean recommendations are 
reported monthly, and on average only 36% change in successive months, while over three 
months 59% change. We reason that since much of the information used to form the mean 
brokers‟ recommendation is dated, funds may be more inclined to act on upgrades (or 
downgrades) of the recommendation in choosing stocks to buy (or sell). But, it is expected that 
the level of the brokers‟ recommendation will moderate the decision to buy based on the 
magnitude of an upgrade. That is, a one point upgrade from “buy” to “strong buy” is viewed 
more favorably than an upgrade from “sell” to “hold”. Furthermore, where the motive for buying 
and selling stocks is a response to fund flows, the trades will be informed by the standing 
recommendation. Our intuition is supported by Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986), who find 
both brokers‟ recommendation and change in brokers‟ recommendation predict higher stock 
returns. 
A regression is used to determine the relation between the net purchases of a stock and the 
stock‟s brokers‟ recommendations and the changes to these recommendations. Similar to Brown, 
Wei, and Wermers (2008) we include only those stocks that have been traded by five or more 
                                                 
7
 Elton, Gruber, Krasny and Ozelge (2006) caution the use of quarterly mutual fund holdings since approximately 
20% of the within-quarter transactions are omitted. We recognize that this is a limitation of our analyses but argue 
that these omitted transactions should not differentially affect trades consistent with and trades contrary to brokers‟ 
recommendations. 
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funds in a period.
8
 We calculate the net number of funds that purchased each stock (the number 
of funds buying a stock minus the number of funds that were sellers) during that period.
9
 By 
using the net number of funds purchasing a stock, we implicitly give equal weight to the 
decisions of each fund irrespective of its size, and thus avoid a measure (such as net purchases by 
value) that is dominated by the actions of large funds. 
Using a pooled regression, we use equation (1) to estimate the relation between net 
purchasers and mean brokers‟ recommendation and the change in the mean brokers‟ 
recommendation over three months. 
)1(εΔBrokRecbBrokRecbapurchasersNet itit2it10it  
where: 
 
months. over threetion recommenda brokers'mean in  changeΔBrokRec
and  t;period endat  istock for tion recommenda brokers'mean BrokRec
 t;periodin  istock  selling funds ofnumber 
 tperiodin  istock  buying funds ofnumber purchasersNet
it
it
it
 
[Insert Table 1] 
  The results from this regression are presented in Table 1 and summarized in equation (2). 
As expected, the explanatory power is low, but the regressor coefficients have the expected sign, 
and are significant at the 1% level.
10
 This supports our use of the predicted net number of funds 
                                                 
8
 We seek to limit the influence that thinly traded stocks have on our model by excluding them from the estimation.  
9
 By calculating the net number of funds purchasing stocks, we implicitly assign equal weight to funds‟ buy and sell 
decisions in estimating our proxy for “broker-ranking”. However, the motivations for buying or selling stock may 
differ, and possibly respond to a fund‟s inflows or outflows during a period. 
10
 We also estimate alternative models with contemporaneous monthly mean brokers‟ recommendation and up to six 
lagged terms. The model we use performs similarly, and is selected because of its parsimony and intuitive appeal. 
We also establish that the regression coefficients are reasonably stable over time through successive cross-sectional 
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purchasing a stock as a measure of its “quasi-broker-ranking”. Accordingly, the estimated model 
is employed to rank stocks based on their quasi-broker-ranking (QBR) using their mean brokers‟ 
recommendations as follows: 
)2(ΔBrokRec2.19BrokRec1.244.16RBˆQ ititit  
To determine if changes to a fund‟s stock holdings are aligned with or are contrary to brokers‟ 
recommendations, we rank stocks held by a fund at the start of a period by using the QBRs.  
4.2.2. Assignment to broker-rank buckets 
For each mutual fund, we construct twenty approximately equal-value buckets 
(QBR_Buckets) using the QBR rankings. Thus, each bucket accounts for approximately 5% of 
the fund‟s start-of-period holdings by value. Additionally, since we wish to examine changes to a 
fund‟s holdings that include stocks that were not held at the start of the period, we include these 
in the ranking process to ensure their assignment to the appropriate QBR_Bucket. Our 
QBR_Buckets are ranked in ascending order, and are only approximately equal in value. This is 
because we assign complete holdings of each stock to a bucket, and where a stock straddles a 
preferred boundary half of the holdings and trades are assigned to the bucket on either side. 
Furthermore, we assign stocks to 10 QBR_Buckets when we are unable to do so for 20, such as 
when the holding of a particular stock exceeds 5% of a fund‟s holding. 
                                                                                                                                                             
regressions. Our model parallels Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), who use quarterly changes in brokers‟ 
recommendations with four lagged terms as regressors. However, as a ratio (per cent change in holdings of 
individual stock), the dependent variable used by Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) has several potential problems. It 
gives equal weight to a small holding of a stock as to a large stock holding.  Potentially, the impact of a large dollar 
disposal of a large stock holding may be dwarfed by a relatively small dollar acquisition of a small stock holding 
with a similar change in broker ranking. Furthermore, the minimum ratio will be -1 (disposals) but the maximum 
ratio depends on how small the initial holding is relative to the (buy) trade. 
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In calculating the value of trading in each QBR_Bucket, stock purchases are assigned a 
positive value, and sales a negative value. Our assignment of stocks to approximately equal value 
buckets permits us to conclude that preferential trading with respect to the quasi-broker-ranking 
of the stock has occurred for any fund-period if we observe a significant relation between trades 
and QBR across QBR Buckets.   
 
4.2.3. Regression analysis of brokers’ recommendation adoptions 
The association between brokers‟ recommendations and the fund‟s decision to trade stocks is 
assessed by regressing the value of bucket j traded on the QBR of bucket j as follows: 
)3(εQBR_BucketβαTradeValue jjj  
where: 
j. QBR_Bucketin  stocks ofnumber   n
and  t; time tomonths over threetion recommenda brokers'mean in  changeΔBrokRec
 t;period endat  istock for tion recommenda brokers'mean BrokRec
 ;ΔBrokRec2.19BrokRec1.244.16 RBˆQ
 t;period ofstart  at the held istock  of valueheldstock Value
 t;period during  tradedistock  of value tradedstock Value
);
heldstock Value
heldstock Value
RBˆQ(QBR_Bucket
; tradedstock ValueTradeValue
i
i
iii
i
i
n
1i
i
i
i
n
1i
j
n
1i
ij
 
We repeat this regression for each of the 44,315 fund-periods. 
By construction, the value of stock in each QBR_Bucket at the start of a period is unrelated 
to the buckets‟ QBR. A significantly negative or positive coefficient on “QBR_Bucket” will 
indicate that the fund has preferentially traded stocks with respect to brokers‟ 
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recommendations.
11
 A positive coefficient (which we term “brokers‟ recommendation beta”) 
indicates that in a fund-period, the stocks that brokers recommend are being purchased, while 
lower recommended stocks are being sold. Conversely, a negative brokers‟ recommendation beta 
identifies portfolio adjustments that are systematically counter to brokers‟ recommendations. The 
number of brokers‟ recommendation betas (at various levels of significance) from the 44,315 
repeat regressions is then compared with critical values from the cumulative binomial 
distribution to establish whether they exceed random expectation with 99% certainty. 
 
4.2.4. Fund returns 
We use two measures of excess returns for funds with significant brokers‟ 
recommendation betas. These returns are calculated for the preceding three- and six-month 
intervals, the period in which the trades occur, and the following three- and six-month intervals. 
The first is annualized excess returns (AER) which we obtain by subtracting the market return 
from the fund‟s return. In the second measure, we follow Thompson (1978) and Cheng, 
Copeland, and O‟Hanlon (1994) in summing regression residuals, but obtain ours from the 
Carhart (1997) augmented model of Fama and French (1995). Specifically, we estimate equation 
(4) for each fund using 60 monthly returns centered
12
 on the period of interest to obtain these 
residuals. 
)4(εUMDbHMLbSMBb)R(RbaRR j ttj4tj3tj2FtMtj1j0Ftj t  
where: 
                                                 
11
 Similar to the method used in Clarke, Cullen, and Gasbarro (2007). 
12
 We maintain the requirement for a 60-month return window, but where necessary (for example, towards the end 
of our sample period), we use a leading or lagged estimation window. 
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return.year -prior low minusreturn year -priorhigh UMD
and ;portfoliosmarket -to-book low minushigh for  returnsHML
;portfoliosstock  large minus smallfor  returnsSMB
return;market  NYSE/AMEX weighted-valueR
 rate) billsury month trea-(onereturn  free-riskR
 t;at time j fundon return R
t
t
t
Mt
Ft
j t
 
We sum the residuals for the relevant intervals and annualize, and refer to the measures as 
annualized cumulative residuals (ACR).  
To determine whether return performance is related to the alignment of a fund‟s trades with 
brokers‟ recommendations, we partition our fund-periods on the basis of brokers‟ 
recommendation betas that are statistically negative or positive. We employ t-tests to determine 
whether the mean returns are statistically different for these two groups, for both the AER and 
ACR measures. 
 
5. Trade alignment and returns 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Our sample contains 2,730 distinct mutual funds, and 44,315 fund-periods that meet our 
selection and data quality criteria. Panel A of Table 2 shows the distribution of days in each 
period and number of stocks in each fund. These reflect the predominance of 90-day periods 
(28,234), and a small number of funds holding a large number of stocks. Panel B documents 
annualized excess returns (AER) and annualized cumulative residuals (ACR) over three months 
following trading for 20,864 fund-periods in which we can match returns. We also present 
returns for partitions based on the median size, liquidity
13
 and turnover. For each variable, we 
                                                 
13
 We define fund liquidity as a value weighted average of stock liquidity. Stock liquidity is determined from a 
variant of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure: T
1t itit
it
i
VolPrice
returnStock
T
1
lnliquidityStock
 where: T= number of days in 
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determine the median for each year from the full sample and use these to partition the data. This 
mitigates the bias from increasing fund size and liquidity over the 12-year period. The arithmetic 
mean return of all funds over the three-month interval following the period in which we examine 
fund trades is -0.5% per annum measured by AER and -0.3% per annum measured by ACR. The 
partitions based on size and turnover highlight minor differences using both AER and ACR. 
When measured by AER, funds with less-liquid portfolios outperform by 4.5% per annum, but 
perform similarly when measured by ACR. The difference between these two measures likely 
reflects the superior performance of the low capitalization stocks over the period of the study. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
5.2. Regression analyses 
Using equation (3), we perform 44,315 univariate linear regressions to determine if there is a 
relation between brokers‟ recommendations and proportion of stocks traded by a fund during a 
period. Each regression is for one fund-period, and fund-periods with recommendation betas 
significant at the various levels are identified. A positive recommendation beta indicates that 
adjustments to a fund‟s portfolio during a period are consistent with brokers‟ recommendations; 
highly recommended stocks are purchased and lower recommended stocks are sold. A negative 
recommendation beta suggests funds are using private information; buying lower recommended 
stocks and selling those with higher brokers‟ recommendations.  
Table 3 reports the pooled count over the twelve-year period for the 5%, 10% and 20% 
significance levels (two-tailed). Using the binomial distribution, we are able to determine that the 
frequency of all recommendation betas differs from that expected by random occurrence with 
                                                                                                                                                             
a quarter; Stock returnit = daily stock return; Priceit= daily price for stock i; and Volit= daily market turnover of stock 
i. 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 17 
99% statistical confidence. Our interest is in funds with significantly negative betas since we 
classify these as trading only on private information. To support our belief that they are correctly 
classified, we compare different significance levels on our regressions. If a significant negative 
beta arises randomly, then altering the level of significance would cause the proportions of funds 
exhibiting significant brokers‟ recommendation betas to approximate these levels. As can be 
seen, at 5% significance, 3.3% is observed, and when we relax the level to 20%, only 8.8% is 
observed. The former is above the expected proportion of 2.5%, while the latter is below the 
expected proportion of 10%. While some misclassification is expected, the relative stability of 
these proportions is indicative of appropriate identification.  
[Insert Table 3] 
In subsequent analyses we use betas from the regressions that are significant at the 10% 
level. Our methodology allows the identification of funds that use private information to conduct 
their trades. These comprise 5.4% of the fund-periods,
14
 compared with 20.7% of fund-periods 
that align their trades with brokers‟ recommendations. Approximately four times as many funds 
trade with brokers‟ recommendations as trade counter to the recommendations. 
5.3. Fund returns 
Our interest is whether funds that trade using private information are able to outperform 
funds that use publicly available information. Accordingly, we compare the returns of the funds 
that trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations with those that adopt them using both the AER 
and ACR measures for the 3- and 6-month intervals following the period in which we observe the 
                                                 
14
 The funds of interest are those that trade on private information that we can statistically confirm at the 10% level 
as having negative brokers‟ recommendation betas. Other funds may also trade similarly, but this relation is either 
non-linear or not statistically significant. Furthermore, funds that use private information that is coincidental with 
brokers‟ recommendations are likely to exist, however, we cannot uniquely classify this group.  
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funds‟ trades. Our sample is reduced to approximately 21,000 fund-periods because we are 
unable to match return and holdings data, and because return outliers are eliminated and a 
minimum of 60 months of returns are required to calculate ACRs.  
Table 4 shows that, on average, funds that trade counter to the brokers‟ recommendations 
statistically and economically outperform funds that align their trades with brokers‟ 
recommendations.
15
 While this is apparent on both AER and ACR return measures, the 
difference in AER means is an annualized return of 2.7% over both the three- and six-month 
intervals following the trades. These results are consistent with our prediction that funds that 
trade on private information which contradicts publicly available information will, on average, 
earn superior returns. 
[Insert Table 4] 
It is clear from the standard errors in Table 4 that mutual funds exhibit a range of return 
performances irrespective of the alignment of their trades with brokers‟ recommendations. That 
is, while the mean performances of the two groups differ, the advantage of using private 
information to conduct trades is evident as a systematic effect only after a large number of fund-
periods are examined. 
 
6. Robustness and extensions 
                                                 
15
 It is possible that individual funds that trade counter to brokers‟ recommendation may achieve a positive abnormal 
return through stock price reversals following an over-reaction of herds to brokers‟ recommendations. Funds that are 
tardy in their trades may receive only the penalty of the price reversal, and receive it sooner than the six-month lag 
documented by Brown, Wei and Wermers (2008). However, in analyses we document in Tables 5 and 7 our results 
do not appear to be driven by the underperformance of fund‟s that align their trades with brokers‟ recommendations 
as this possibility would suggest.  
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6.1. Trade alignment and fund performance with control variables 
We next investigate the relation between the alignment of a fund‟s trades with brokers‟ 
recommendations and its performance while controlling for serial correlation of fund returns.
16
 
To achieve this, we estimate equation (5) which includes lagged returns and separate dummy 
variables for brokers‟ recommendation betas that are statistically negative, (NBR) and for those 
that are statistically positive (PBR) along with liquidity, turnover and size. Furthermore, the 
multiplicative interaction of NBR and PBR with the lagged return and fund size are included. 
)5(ε)SizebRbRNBR(b
)SizebRbRPBR(b
SizebTObLiqbRbRbNBRbPBRbaR
j tj t131j t12j t11
j t101j t9j t8
j t7j t6j t51j t4j t3j t2j t101j t
 
where: 
 t.intervalin  j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;intervalin  j fund of turnover portfolio edstandardizTO
 t;intervalin  j fund ofliquidity  portfolio average edstandardizLiq
1; tintervalin  j fundon return R
 t;periodin  j fundon return R
 t;periodin  j fundfor  betation recommenda brokers' negativefor  abledummy variNBR
 t;periodin  j fundfor  betation recommenda brokers' positivefor  abledummy variPBR
1; tintervalin  j fundon return R
j t
j t
j t
1j t
j t
j t
j t
1j t
 
In this analysis, the returns 1j tj t1j t RandR,R are either annualized excess returns (AER) or 
annualized cumulative residuals (ACR) depending on the model under consideration. 
Table 5 reports the results from various specifications of this regression. Consistent with 
Prediction 1, the coefficient on the negative brokers‟ recommendation beta dummy variable is 
always significant and positive when returns are measured by both AER and ACR. In contrast, 
for the positive brokers‟ recommendation beta dummy variable, the coefficient is not statistically 
                                                 
16
 For example, Ferris and Yan (2009) report significant positive serial correlation of fund performance. 
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different from zero.
17
 Model 1 confirms the result for the „3-month after‟ return in Table 4 that 
funds that trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations outperform funds that align their trades 
with recommendations.
18
  
Model 2 shows that AERs in the three months following trading are positively correlated 
with the contemporaneous-period and prior-period returns in panel A. The positive correlation 
disappears, with the coefficient on the period return in panel B becoming negative when the 
Fama-French-Carhart adjusted ACR returns are considered. The difference between the measures 
suggests the positive correlation observed in AERs is driven by a common response to one or 
more of the factors in the Fama-French-Carhart model. However, our objective is to control for 
serial correlation while observing the effect of trade alignment on fund returns and this is 
achieved with either of the return measures. Indeed, model 2 demonstrates that on both measures 
the superior performance of funds that trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations (relative to 
funds that align their trades) persists after controlling for past performance. On AER, the superior 
average performance reduces to 1.7% per annum whereas it is almost unchanged from model 1 at 
1.3% per annum on ACR. 
Model 3 allows us to investigate whether the serial correlation of fund returns is affected by 
the alignment of the fund‟s trades with recommendations. This is achieved by relaxing the 
restriction in model 2 that the coefficients on the period and prior returns remain the same, 
irrespective of the alignment of a fund‟s trades. It is apparent that how a fund‟s prior returns 
affect its returns after the trading period, depends on trade alignment. The period AER of funds 
                                                 
17
 With the exception of model 5 in panel A. 
18
 For example, the sum of the intercept and the coefficient on the positive brokers‟ recommendation dummy in 
model 1 in panel A of Table 5 yields -0.007 as tabulated in panel A (positive betas column) of Table 4.  
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that trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations explains 17.3%19 of this return, compared to 
1.3%
20
 for funds with positive brokers‟ recommendation betas. Given our presumption that funds 
that align their trades counter to brokers‟ recommendations are acting on private information, this 
result suggests that persistence in fund performance (good and bad) is largely driven by funds 
that use this information. When measured by ACR, return autocorrelations continue to 
demonstrate a dependence on the alignment of trades with information. However, the negative 
autocorrelation observed in model 2 persists, and becomes more negative when trades are 
aligned. 
With the exception of funds that experience low AERs, it can be shown from the results of 
model 3 that counter recommendation traders outperform funds that align their trades with 
brokers‟ recommendations. Consistently, within the range of normal returns, funds with negative 
brokers‟ recommendation betas are shown to outperform funds with positive betas using the 
ACR measure of return. The average superior performance of negative beta funds is 1.9% per 
annum when measured by AER and 1.4% per annum when measured by ACR. 
Models 4 and 5 include additional liquidity, turnover, and size explanatory variables. We 
include these variables to control for the size and liquidity effects documented by Chen, Hong, 
Huang, and Kubik (2004), and because portfolio turnover may affect returns either as a return to 
active management, or because of momentum in the returns of the stocks in the funds‟ extant 
portfolios. Size and turnover are also used as control variables by Kacperczyk and Seru (2007). 
We observe a negative relation between fund return and liquidity in panel A which disappears in 
panel B. This may be attributed to the superior performance of the low capitalization stocks held 
                                                 
19
 0.113 + 0.060 = 0.173 
20
 0.113 - 0.100 = 0.013 
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by funds over the sample period (Table 2, panel B), which is controlled in the ACR return 
measure. Turnover insignificantly affects AER and has a modest positive relation with return 
measured by ACR. This suggests that active management provides marginally superior risk 
adjusted gross returns, and does not support the interpretation that the momentum of the stocks in 
the funds‟ extant portfolios is responsible for their return performance. The latter is confirmed in 
separate tests (not reported), which include interaction terms between turnover and prior and 
contemporaneous period return in the regression. In model 4 of Table 5, the difference in the 
average performance of negative and positive beta funds is relatively unchanged from model 3 at 
1.8% per annum and 1.4% per annum when measured by AER and ACR respectively.  
[Insert Table 5] 
6.2. Fund size, trade alignment and performance 
Model 5 of Table 5 shows that over the 3-month interval following trading, returns decrease 
with fund size, at least for funds that either align their trades with brokers‟ recommendations or 
trade counter to them on both return measures. This result is consistent with Chen, Hong, Huang, 
and Kubik (2004), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) and the observed results in the partition on fund 
size in Table 2. It is apparent from the large negative coefficient on the size variable for funds 
that trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations (NBR x Size) that the greatest impact of fund 
size is for funds that trade counter to broker‟s recommendations. Our finding that funds with 
negative brokers‟ recommendation betas outperform positive beta funds by a greater amount 
when they are small is consistent with Prediction 2.  
 
6.3. Robustness of counter-recommendation trading classification 
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According to Chen and Cheng (2006), institutional investors have “timely access” to stock 
recommendations through soft-dollar arrangements. Therefore, it is possible that the funds we 
identify as trading counter to brokers‟ recommendations are simply more efficient users of the 
information on which the recommendations are based, and garner excess returns by first aligning 
their trades with the recommendations and subsequently reversing them. This would give the 
appearance of being counter-recommendation traders. To test this possibility, we investigate 
whether the alignment of a fund‟s trades to yet-to-be-announced brokers‟ recommendations 
differs from their alignment to announced recommendations. If the funds we identify as trading 
counter to recommendations are simply more efficient users of the information, we would expect 
to see alignment of their trades with leading recommendations. 
[Insert Table 6] 
We apply equation (2) to leading brokers‟ recommendations to rank the stocks in each fund-
period before performing a suite of regressions using equation (3) and using the 10% significance 
level. The results presented in Table 6 show that less than 1.5% of funds previously identified as 
counter-recommendation traders align their trades with yet-to-be-announced recommendations. 
In contrast, 22.4% of the funds previously identified as counter-recommendation traders also 
trade counter to yet-to-be announced recommendations. Therefore, it does not appear that trade 
reversals are driving the results. 
 
6.4. Alternative classification of privately informed trading 
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) classify funds with trades that do not correlate with brokers‟ 
recommendations as informed traders. In our analyses, these funds are equivalent to those with 
brokers‟ recommendation betas that are not significantly different from zero. We document the 
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differences between the mean returns of this group and the fund-periods we identify as having 
negative and positive brokers‟ recommendation betas in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7] 
On both AER and ACR measures, the performance of the funds with zero brokers‟ 
recommendation betas is not statistically different from funds with positive recommendation 
betas over the 3- and 6-month intervals following the period of the trades. That is, funds with 
trades that are uncorrelated with brokers‟ recommendations have no return advantage over funds 
that align their trades with brokers‟ recommendations. While some funds in both groups may 
have access to private information, either similar proportions of these funds are present in each 
group, or they represent small proportions. In contrast, the funds that trade counter to brokers‟ 
recommendations, which we classify as privately informed, statistically and economically 
outperform funds whose stock selection is uncorrelated with brokers‟ recommendations.  
By classifying funds whose trades are uncorrelated with recommendations as the “informed 
traders”, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) would predict that these funds should outperform funds 
with positive recommendation betas. However, our results do not identify any significant return 
difference. Furthermore, they would predict that zero recommendation beta funds would 
outperform negative recommendation beta funds, while our results show the reverse. Kacperczyk 
and Seru (2007) do not distinguish between the funds we partition into negative and positive 
betas and accordingly do not identify the performance difference that we observe.  
7. Conclusions 
Integrating the quarterly reported stock holdings of mutual funds obtained from Thomson 
Financial Services Inc., with the IBES consensus recommendations, we develop a method to 
examine whether a mutual fund aligns its trades with the IBES recommendations. The combined 
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dataset covers 44,315 fund-periods between 1994 and 2005. Following Kacperczyk and Seru 
(2007), we classify these brokers‟ recommendations as public information, that is, available to 
the universe of informed and uninformed mutual funds.  
We identify fund-periods characterized by systematic trading in the opposite direction to 
what would be expected if they followed recommendations, and argue that they do so using 
private information. These privately informed funds exhibit a superior average performance of 
1.7% per annum after we control for serial correlation of fund returns. We also predict that 
smaller funds are better able to capture the benefit of private information, and consistent with this 
expectation, find empirically that small funds which trade counter to brokers‟ recommendations 
earn even greater average returns.  
Our results are robust to autocorrelation of fund returns and to the inclusion of fund size, 
portfolio liquidity and turnover control variables. Furthermore, we establish that our results are 
not driven by funds that more efficiently use publicly available information and subsequently 
reverse their position. 
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Table 1 
Brokers recommendations and net purchases, 1994 to 2005 
Model Coefficient t-statistic Adjusted R Square 
Constant 4.16*** 36.29 0.013 
Brok Rec -1.24*** -23.73  
 Brok Rec -2.19*** -23.50  
itit2it10it εΔBrokRecbBrokRecbapurchasersNet , where: Net purchasersit = 
number of funds buying stock i in period t – number of funds selling stock i in period t, 
Brok Recit = mean broker‟s recommendation for stock i in period t,  Brok Recit = change 
in mean brokers‟ recommendation over three months. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics, 1994 to 2005 
Panel A. Fund descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of fund periods 44,315   
Number of Funds 2,730   
Days in Period 118 92 43 
Number of Stocks in Portfolio 154 93 239 
Panel B. Fund returns over three months following trading 
 N 
Annualized Excess 
Return 
Annualized 
Cumulative Residuals 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
All Fund-Periods 20,864 -0.005 0.205 -0.003 0.126 
Fund Size - Small 10,365 0.000 0.219 0.002 0.135 
Fund Size - Large 10,499 -0.011 0.191 -0.008 0.116 
Portfolio Liquidity - Low 10,458 0.017 0.243 -0.004 0.151 
Portfolio Liquidity - High 10,406 -0.028 0.155 -0.002 0.094 
Portfolio Turnover - Low 10,250 -0.008 0.195 0.000 0.115 
Portfolio Turnover - High 10,614 -0.003 0.214 -0.006 0.131 
Fund liquidity is defined as a value weighted average of stock liquidity, which is determined from: 
T
1t itit
it
i
VolPrice
returnStock
T
1
lnliquidityStock
where: T= number of days in a quarter; Stock returnit = daily stock 
return; Priceit= daily price for stock i; and Volit= daily market turnover of stock i. 
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Table 3 
Significant brokers‟ recommendation betas, 1994 to 2005 
   Recommendation Beta 
Significance 
Level 
N Binomial CV 
Range 
Negative Positive 
Min Max Count Percent Count Percent 
5% 44,315 1,032 1,185 1,457 3.3%*** 6,341 14.3%*** 
10%  2,108 2,323 2,394 5.4%*** 9,176 20.7%*** 
20%  4,285 4,579 3,906 8.8%*** 13,137 29.6%*** 
The number of statistically significant (at the respective levels) brokers‟ 
recommendation betas is generated from linear regressions of: 
jjj ε QBR_BucketβαTradeValue  where: 
j. QBR_Bucketin  stocks ofnumber   n
and  t; time tomonths over threetion recommenda brokers'mean in  changeΔBrokRec
 t;period endat  istock for tion recommenda brokers'mean BrokRec
 ;ΔBrokRec2.19BrokRec1.244.16 ingroker_rankBˆ Quasi
 t;period ofstart  at the held istock  of valueheldstock Value
 t;period during  tradedistock  of value tradedstock Value
);
heldstock Value
heldstock Value
ingroker_rankBˆQuasi_(QBR_Bucket
; tradedstock ValueTradeValue
i
i
iii
i
i
n
1i
i
i
i
n
1i
j
n
1i
ij
 
Cumulative binomial distribution critical values (Bin CV) reflect a 1% 
probability that a lower (Min) or greater (Max) count occurs by chance. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4 
Mean returns for funds with significant broker recommendation betas 
Interval N Negative betas Positive betas Difference 
Panel A.  Annualized excess return  1994–2005 
3-month after 23,189 0.020 -0.007 0.027*** 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
6-month after 23,042 0.010 -0.017 0.027*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Panel B.  Annualized cumulative residuals  1994–2005 
3-month after 19,916 0.009 -0.005 0.014*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
6-month after 19,776 0.003 -0.001 0.005* 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Mean returns and their differences are accompanied by their standard errors in parentheses. The t-
distribution is used to determine the significance of the difference between the negative and 
positive mean returns. We calculate annualized excess return by subtracting the market return from the 
fund‟s return. To obtain annualized cumulative residual return, we estimate: 
jttj4tj3tj2ftmtj1j0ftj t UMDbHMLbSMBb)R(RbaRR  
for each fund using monthly returns and cumulate the residuals over their respective intervals, where Rjt is 
the return on fund j at time t, Rft is the risk-free return, Rmt is the value weighted market return, SMBt is the 
return for small minus large stock portfolios, HMLt is the returns for high minus low book-to-market 
portfolios and UMDt is high prior-year return minus low prior-year return. Brokers‟ recommendation betas 
are obtained from the regression: 
jjj εQBR_BucketβαTradeValue  when a 10% significance level (2-
tailed) is used. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 5  
Performance after alignment of fund trades with brokers‟ recommendations 
  Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A.  3-Month annualized excess return  1994–2005 
Intercept -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.366*** 0.347*** 
 (-1.46) (-1.57) (-1.49) (15.73) (13.95) 
PBRjt -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.082** 
 (-1.37) (-0.49) (-1.21) (-1.07) (2.04) 
NBRjt 0.023*** 0.015** 0.015** 0.014** 0.201*** 
 (3.64) (2.48) (2.42) (2.24) (3.03) 
Rjt  0.096*** 0.113*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
  (12.402) (12.48) (10.78) (10.77) 
PBRjt x Rjt   -0.100*** -0.088*** -0.088*** 
   (-5.52) (-4.61) (-4.62) 
NBRjt x Rjt   0.060* 0.064** 0.066** 
   (1.82) (1.98) (2.04) 
Rjt-1 (3-month)  0.061*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.032*** 
  (9.76) (9.07) (7.76) (2.57) 
PBRjt x Rjt-1   -0.026* -0.024 -0.023 
   (-1.70) (-1.54) (-1.52) 
NBRjt x Rjt-1   -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 
   (-0.39) (-0.52) (-0.53) 
Liqjt    -0.353*** -0.356*** 
    (-17.58) (-17.72) 
TOjt    0.001 -0.005 
    (0.51) (-1.03) 
Sizejt    -0.025 0.000 
    (-1.58) (-0.02) 
PBRjt x Sizejt     -0.085** 
     (-2.14) 
NBRjt x Sizejt     -0.186*** 
     (-2.84) 
N 23,188 22,292 22,292 22,292 22,292 
Adjusted R
2 
0.001 0.013 0.014 0.029 0.030 
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Panel B.  3-Month annualized cumulative residuals  1994–2005 
Intercept -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.009 0.004 
 (-1.85) (-2.18) (-2.17) (0.71) (0.30) 
PBRjt -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 
 (-1.42) (-1.24) (-1.40) (-1.40) (0.46) 
NBRjt 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.088** 
 (3.04) (3.18) (3.13) (3.23) (2.35) 
Rjt  -0.036*** -0.023** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
  (-4.69) (-2.55) (-2.65) (-2.62) 
PBRjt x Rjt   -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.055*** 
   (-2.92) (-2.89) (-2.92) 
NBRjt x Rjt   -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 
   (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.29) 
Rjt-1 (3-month)  0.010 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
  (1.41) (2.16) (2.16) (2.17) 
PBRjt x Rjt-1   -0.036** -0.036** -0.037** 
   (-2.10) (-2.11) (-2.12) 
NBRjt x Rjt-1   0.008 0.008 0.005 
   (0.26) (0.25) (0.15) 
Liqjt    0.020* 0.019* 
    (1.74) (1.68) 
TOjt    0.002* 0.003 
    (1.70) (1.06) 
Sizejt    -0.032*** -0.026** 
    (-3.60) (-2.51) 
PBRjt x Sizejt     -0.013 
     (-0.58) 
NBRjt x Sizejt     -0.076** 
     (-2.06) 
N 19,915 19,386 19,386 19,386 19,386 
Adjusted R
2 
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Regression of: 
 
j tj t131j t12j t11
j t101j t9j t8
j t7j t6j t51j t4j t3j t2j t101j t
ε)SizebRbRNBR(b
)SizebRbRPBR(b
SizebTObLiqbRbRbNBRbPBRbaR
 
where: 
 t.intervalin  j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;intervalin  j fund of turnover portfolio edstandardizTO
 t;intervalin  j fund ofliquidity  portfolio average edstandardizLiq
1; tintervalin  j fundon return R
 t;periodin  j fundon return R
 t;periodin  j fundfor  betation recommenda brokers' negativefor  abledummy variNBR
 t;periodin  j fundfor  betation recommenda brokers' positivefor  abledummy variPBR
1; tintervalin  j fundon return R
j t
j t
j t
1j t
j t
j t
j t
1j t
 
The dummy variables are the betas from the regression
jjj εQBR_BucketβαTradeValue  that are 
significantly negative or positive at the 10% level. 
The returns 1j tj t1j t RandR,R are either annualized excess returns (AER) or annualized cumulative 
residuals (ACR) depending on the panel under consideration. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 6  
Contemporaneous and leading brokers‟ recommendations 
 Leading Recommendations 
 
Reject 
Recommendation 
Not 
Significant 
Accept 
Recommendation 
Total 
 
Reject Recommendation 518 1,763 34 2,282 
In Current Period (22.4%) (76.2%) (1.5%) (100.0%) 
Crosstabulation of funds‟ alignment of trades with contemporaneous brokers‟ 
recommendations with their alignment with leading recommendations. The 
brokers‟ recommendation betas are obtained from the regression: 
jjj εQBR_BucketβαTradeValue  when a 10% significance level (2-tailed) is used 
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Table 7 
Broker Recommendation Betas and Mean Returns Differences 
Interval N  Negative minus-
Zero Betas 
Zero minus-
Positive Betas 
Panel A.  Annualized Excess Return  1994–2005 
3-month after 23,189  0.025*** 0.002 
   (0.010) (0.008) 
6-month after 23,042  0.023*** 0.004 
   (0.008) (0.006) 
Panel B.  Annualized Cumulative Residuals  1994–2005 
3-month after 19,916  0.011** 0.002 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
6-month after 19,776  0.005 0.000 
   (0.004) (0.003) 
Mean return differences are accompanied by their standard errors in parentheses. The t-distribution 
is used to determine the significance of the differences between the negative and positive mean, 
negative and zero, and zero and positive beta returns. We calculate annualized excess return by 
subtracting the market return from the fund‟s return. To obtain annualized cumulative residual return, we 
estimate: 
j tt4jt3jt2jftmt1j0jftj t UMDbHMLbSMBb)RR(baRR  
for each fund using monthly returns and cumulate the residuals over their respective intervals, where Rjt is 
the return on fund j at time t, Rft is the risk-free return, Rmt is the value weighted market return, SMBt is the 
return for small minus large stock portfolios, HMLt is the returns for high minus low book-to-market 
portfolios and UMDt is high prior-year return minus low prior-year return. Brokers‟ recommendation betas 
are obtained from the regression: 
jjj εQBR_BucketβαTradeValue  when a 10% significance level (2-
tailed) is used. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
